## Genetics, Genomics and

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# Genetics, Genomics and Global Health – Inequalities, Identities and Insecurities

Scienti c advances in our understanding of genetics and genomics may generate major improvements for human health in the coming decades. From a global health perspective, however, the translation of genomics into new medical treatments also raises profound international and local issues around inequality, identity and insecurity:

#### Inequalities

therapies could further widen the gap in health outcomes between high-income countries, and low- and middle- income countries. Many people living in low- and middle- income countries bear a disproportionate burden of causes compared to other world regions; and bene ts of medical research through healthcare delivery systems. Many such countries do not have the capacity to undertake their own genetic research on important endemic diseases, and scienti c research is often not What will be the implications of such disparities for socio-economic and health inequalities? What are the global health access challenges around genetic and genomics-based therapies? What is the complex role that low- and middleincome countries play in the rise of genomic

#### Identities

The genetic and genomic information advances plays into an array of shifting information has already provided many patients and families with important health knowledge and is increasingly central to research, drug screening and drug prescription – including the promise of 'personalised' medicine. Yet ethnicity, disease, and socio-psychological in which people identify themselves subjectively as persons or groups in terms of ethnicity, health, and character; the way in which socioeconomic groups such as employers, insurance companies, schools, local communities those subjected to 'genetic appraisal'. The recently established Personal Genome Project-UK (PGP-UK) exempli es the uncertainties and

controversies around commercialisation and

#### Insecurities

generates concern about sources of vulnerability and insecurity. The ability to genetically manipulate organisms provokes fears around the accidental – or even intentional – release of new, genetically modi ed organisms that could dramatically civil liberty sensitivities also arise given that bioinformation has become an invaluable resource not just for life science research, but is rapidly emerging as a lucrative commodity. For citizens, moreover, additional insecurities arise from the fact that genetic data of samples and the storage of genetic data in

brings together experts from the elds of policy, research, industry, foundations, journalism, and non-governmental organisations in order to assess how the rise of genetic and genomic challenges has begun to shape to the eld of global

#### Key questions to be addressed on the day include:

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  t 8IBU DBO CF EPOF UP BEESFTtherhed and specialised panels on access, inequality, insecurity and discrimination innovation, regulation, intellectual property, based on genetic and genomic information? ethics, and health security/protection
  t 8IBU SPMF EP MPX BOE NJEEMF JODPNF

- t )PX DBO HFOPNJD SFTFBSDI C ...improve global health equity?...
- t 8IZ JT UIFSF VOFRVBM BDDFT1 technology and genomic research?
  t 8IBU JT UIF TDPQF PG JOUFSE
- collaboration in genomic global health?
  t 81BU BSF UIF IFBMUIDBSF DIBN

#### Who Should Attend?

- t 11BSNBDPHFOPNJDT DPNQBOJE and developing medicines used in global
- t \$PNQBOJFT BOE SFTFBSDI JOT
- and diagnostics

  1 P M J D Z N B L F S T G S P N H P W F S O international organisations concerned about access to, and regulation of, medicines
- t 4PDJBM TDJFOUJTUT BOBMZTJ
- to improving drug safety, personal genomics, genetic counseling, genetic diagnostics and public health
- 'PVOEBUJPOT EPOPST SFTFB innovation, diagnostics, and drug screening
- genomics, large genomic data collections, genetic diagnosis, genetic privacy and genetic discrimination

#### Why Should You Attend?

- t -FBSO BCPVU BOE TIBSF UIF M on access to medicines and pharmaceutical innovation in global health
- from industry, government, research, non governmental organisations, and the med



### **Speakers and Participants**

#### Keynote speaker

#### Professor Andrew Lakoff

Professor Andrew Lakoff is Associate Professor of Sociology, Anthropology and Communication at the University of Southern California, where he directs the Research Cluster in Science, Technology and Society. He is the author of Pharmaceutical Reason: Knowledge and Value in Global Psychiatry (Cambridge UP, 2005), co-editor of Global Pharmaceuticals: Ethics, Markets, Practices (Duke UP, 2006) and Biosecurity Interventions: Global Health and Security in Question (Columbia UP, 2008), and editor of Disaster and the Politics of Intervention (Columbia UP, 2010). His current research concerns the articulation of global public health and national security expertise around the problem of emerging infections. This research focuses on the genealogy of techniques of preparedness as they have migrated from Cold War military defence to other domains such as public health and disaster management.

#### Chair

#### Stefan Elbe

Director, Centre for Global Health Policy

#### Con rmed Speakers and Participants (Selected)

#### Stephan Beck

Professor of Medical Genomics and Director, PGP-UK, UCL Cancer Institute, University College London

#### Louise Bezuidenhot

Associate Research Fellow, EGENIS, University of Exeter

#### Gemma Buckland-Merrett

Research Fellow, Centre for Global Health Policy, University of Sussex

#### Martin Colla

Programme Director, Asia, Cepheid High Burden & Developing Countries

#### Edward D Blair

PhD MBA, Integrated Medicines Ltd

#### Donna Dickenson

Emeritus Professor of Medical Ethics and Humanities, University of London

#### Frederick C. Dubee

Member of the Advisor Board and Honorary Professor, BGI; Senior Of cer in the Executive Of ce of the Secretary General, United Nations

#### Audrey Duncanson

Senior Portfolio Developer, The Wellcome Trust

#### Stefan Elbe

Director, Centre for Global Health Policy, University of Sussex

#### Christian Enemark

Reader, Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University

#### Alex Faulkner

Reader, Centre for Global Health Policy, University of Sussex

#### Chiara Garattini

Researcher, Intel Health & Life Sciences

#### Carrie Heitmeyer

Postdoctoral Researcher, Department of Anthropology, University of Sussex

#### Rebecca J Hester

Assistant Professor of Social Medicine, Institute for the Medical Humanities, University of Texas Medical Branch

#### Amy Hinterberger

Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Warwick

#### Stuart Hogarth

Wellcome Trust Senior Research Fellow, Kings College London

#### Michael Hopkins

Senior Lecturer, SPRU (the Science Policy Research Unit), University of Sussex

#### Andrew Lakoff

Associate Professor of Sociology, Anthropology and Communication, University of Southern California

#### Melissa Leach

Director, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex

#### Phoebe Li

Lecturer, Law, University of Sussex

#### Christopher Long

Centre for Global Health Policy, University of Sussex

#### Kato Masae

Postdoctoral Researcher, Department of Anthropology, University of Sussex

#### Melanie Newport

Director, Wellcome Trust Brighton and Sussex Centre for Global Health Research

#### Paul Nightingale

Professor of Strategy, SPRU (the Science Policy Research Unit), University of Sussex

#### Prasanna K Patra

Postdoctoral Researcher, Department of Anthropology, University of Sussex

#### James Revil

Research Fellow, SPRU (the Science Policy Research Unit), University of Sussex

#### Anne Roemer-Mahler

Centre for Global Health Policy, University of Sussex

#### Achim Rosemann

Postdoctoral Researcher, Department of Anthropology, University of Sussex

#### Cathy Roth (TBC)

Scienti c Policy Advisor, Of ce of the Assistant Director-General, Health Security and the Environment Cluster, World Health Organization

#### Margaret Sleebloom-Faulkner

Director, Centre for Bionetworking, Professor of Social and Medical Anthropology

#### Suli Su

Associate Professor, Peking Union Medical College, PRC

#### Helen Wallace

Director, GeneWatch UK

#### Annie Wilkinson

Post Doctorate Researcher, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex

### Panel themes

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#### Personal Genome Project (PGP)-UK and Genetic Privacy

Genomic information can reveal the potential of individuals to develop a certain condition. Due to worries about the privacy of individuals, families and social groups, various regulatory tools have been developed to protect the genetic privacy of individuals: the Bermuda Principle and Fort Lauderdale Declaration (1996-2003) and the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Human Data (2003). But new developments make it hard to implement these ideals, also in the UK. In December 2012, David Cameron announced the 100K Genome Project, which aims to sequence the genome of 100K patients within 5 years. Ethical protocol was to protect the privacy of patients. But now Britain is also opening up the NHS to commercially used genome sequencing through the Personal Genomics Project (PGP). Thus, last November, Stephan Beck (UCL) announced the establishment of a British Personal Genome Project (PGP-UK), which will recruit volunteers to provide DNA and health data with no restrictions on their use. This panel discusses the protection of the privacy of individuals who have entrusted genomic data to PGP-UK, in the light of (1) the impossibility of total privacy protection when genetic data are stored online, as they can be triangulated with other information; (2) the broad consent used by international consortia sharing data and large population studies; and (3) the ability of direct to consumer companies such as 23andMe and deCODEme to trade genetic information of rare conditions of individuals. What does privacy mean anno 2014?

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#### Manipulated Microbes: Genetics, Genomics and Global Health Security

Advances in our understanding of genetics are generating new concerns about global health security. Scienti c gain-of-function research on enhancing the transmissibility of lethal in uenza viruses (such as H5N1 and H7N9) has provoked widespread contestation about whether such research should be undertaken, under which conditions, and what risks it poses to the wider international community. High-level and acrimonious diplomatic confrontations have been sparked about whether countries have an obligation to share genetic sequence data from newly emerging viruses with other countries, and which rules should govern the scienti c and commercial exploitation of such data. Within the context of bioterrorism, further concern still has surfaced about the deliberate genetic manipulation of lethal microorganism in ways that would be dif cult to detect and very challenging to treat with existing therapies. All the while the technologies for manipulating genes is becoming more widely available, with high school and amateur bio-hacking groups now routinely experimenting on microorganisms raising the possibility of accidents. This panel explores the implications of the rise and proliferation of synthetic biology for global health security. What are the new threats to global health security that are emerging? Are such threats exaggerated or underappreciated? How can these new insecurities best be managed in the twenty- rst century?

## 4

Emerging Molecular Diagnostics – What are the Challenges to Widespread Implementation?

Advances in genomics have led to hopes that new diagnostic tools will allow an era of 'personalised' or 'strati ed' medicine, with molecular diagnostics being used to facilitate provision of more effective interventions, avoiding adverse drug reactions and targeting expensive therapies to patients who are most likely to bene t from them. Low and middle-income countries (LMICs) theoretically could bene t most from novel diagnostics and drugs developed by pharmacogenomics guidance given the high disease burden. However, these technologies require substantial infrastructures to support them in terms of laboratories,